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Approved For Release 2002/10/16 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000500090004-4

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

Copy 7 of 7

10 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Security Center

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : Control of Visits to Contractor's Facilities

REFERENCE :

1. I have reviewed the draft of referenced memorandum provided me this date and concerning which you requested my reaction by tonight.

2. This memorandum deals with a very interesting subject, and you will recall it is one which I highlighted during my briefing of the Deputy Director of Security last week as a definite problem area.

3. It is my opinion that the proposed issuance as written will further confuse the situation and contribute further to the chaotic condition which exists at present. For example, in paragraph III. Procedures, the reference indicates that "The Program Director responsible for the contractor's activity will approve or disapprove requests for visits by...persons able to contribute to the management, operation, or success of NRP projects." My question here is which program director is responsible for the contractors under Projects C, (L) and A? Is it the Director, Program A, who has technical management or is it Director, Program B, who has much of the contracting responsibility and, I believe, the security responsibility? With regard to the "K" compartment of Project "O", would the approving Program Director be the Director of Program D (who has technical responsibility) or the Director, Program B, who has contracting and security responsibility?

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4. Attention is further invited to paragraph III. Procedures, wherein it is indicated that requests for visits by those persons ... (representatives of U. S. agencies, departments, and offices, although not connected with NRP activities, need to make the visits in order to discharge properly their official duties in the interests of national defense) will be forwarded to the NRO staff who, in coordination with the appropriate Program Director, will approve or disapprove the visit. By this paragraph then, we have another element, the NRO staff, approving visits to project facilities in addition to the ill-defined Program Director mentioned above. This well may be essential in view of the manner in which the NRO is evolving; however, I suggest we are definitely getting away from the centralized type of control that was so effective during the evolution of these ultra-sensitive programs. In addition, the way I read this latter sub-paragraph, the NRO staff will be authorized to approve visits under Project "O" which, as you know, until now has been the exclusive domain of the OSA.

5. I might mention in passing that historically when a visit was approved by the OSA, the approval also included the concurrence by OSA Contracts that the cost of the visit where appropriate could be charged to the contract.

6. With regard to paragraph IV, Exchange of Information, it is interesting to note that the proposed issuance indicates, "All exchanges of information concerning covert collection systems between NRP covert contractors and United States Government departments and agencies not directly involved in the operation or management of the actual projects, will be effected through and monitored by the NRO Staff." This sentence, therefore, would indicate that the NRO Staff will be the body which will approve, for example, the dissemination of most sensitive information pertaining to Project "O" to various U. S. Government departments and agencies. If the OSA/DDR is to be charged with the responsibility for the security of this top priority project, I am certain that this element of the CIA will not concur with this proposed delegation of authority to the NRO Staff.

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7. This reaction to the proposed memorandum was quickly prepared in order to satisfy your request for a reaction by the close of business today. It is my opinion that the paper as prepared is another example of the continued erosion of the most effective centralized security responsibility which has resulted in the splendid protection of these ultra-sensitive programs since 1955.

SIGNED

[Redacted]  
Chief, Security Staff  
OSA

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OSA/SS: [Redacted]/mpr

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